The Home Out of Context: The Post-Riley Fourth Amendment and Law Enforcement Collection of Smart Meter Data by Duarte, Natasha H.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 93 | Number 4 Article 5
5-1-2015
The Home Out of Context: The Post-Riley Fourth
Amendment and Law Enforcement Collection of
Smart Meter Data
Natasha H. Duarte
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Natasha H. Duarte, The Home Out of Context: The Post-Riley Fourth Amendment and Law Enforcement Collection of Smart Meter Data, 93
N.C. L. Rev. 1140 (2015).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol93/iss4/5
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1140 (2015) 
The Home Out of Context: The Post-Riley Fourth Amendment 
and Law Enforcement Collection of Smart Meter Data* 
INTRODUCTION 
Smart meters1 know when you’re sleeping. They know when 
you’re awake. They might even know whether you’re in the shower or 
watching TV.2 Utility companies are steadily installing these smart 
meters on consumers’ homes.3 Unlike traditional energy meters, 
which show a household’s aggregated electricity use each month, 
smart meters collect fine-grained, minute-by-minute data about 
electricity use and transmit it back to the utility at regular intervals.4 
This data, when collected over time and analyzed, can reveal the 
activities and behavioral patterns of a household.5 Utility records 
have long been of interest in law enforcement investigations,6 and the 
 
 * © 2015 Natasha H. Duarte. 
 1. Smart meters, also referred to as Advanced Metering Infrastructure (“AMI”), are 
electronic utility meters that enable two-way communication between utilities and 
consumers. See Recovery Act Smart Grid Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Advanced 
Metering Infrastructure and Customer Systems, SMARTGRID.GOV, https://www.smartgrid.gov 
/recovery_act/deployment_status/ami_and_customer_systems (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). 
These meters “collect highly granular data on individual electricity consumption and allow 
users to monitor and remotely control their electrical use . . . .” Sonia K. McNeil, Privacy 
and the Modern Grid, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 199, 200 (2011). 
 2. See 2 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., GUIDELINES FOR SMART GRID 
CYBERSECURITY 27 (2010) [hereinafter NIST], available at http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/ 
nistpubs/ir/2014/NIST.IR.7628r1.pdf (concluding that, when analyzed, smart meter data 
can reveal information about people’s lifestyles and appliance use); Jordan Robertson, 
Your Outlet Knows: How Smart Meters Reveal Behavior at Home, What We Watch on TV, 
BLOOMBERG (June 10, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-10/your-outlet-
knows-how-smart-meters-can-reveal-behavior-at-home-what-we-watch-on-tv.html 
(reporting on a German study where researchers were able to ascertain the specific 
television programs people were watching based on data collected by smart meters). 
 3. See, e.g., ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S. SMART GRID 
CASE STUDIES 1 (2011), available at https://www.smartgrid.gov/sites/default/files/doc/ 
files/smartggrid%5B1%5D.pdf (“A recent report . . . predicts that U.S. smart meter 
installations will exceed 80 million by 2015, up from 2 million in 2007.”). But see Smart 
Electric Meters, Advanced Metering Infrastructure, and Meter Communications: Global 
Market Analysis and Forecasts 2014, NAVIGANT RES., http://www.navigantresearch.com/ 
research/smart-meters (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (“The smart electric meter market has 
shifted emphasis to projects in Europe and Asia Pacific while the once hot U.S. market 
has leveled off, as federal funding for projects has been nearly exhausted.”). 
 4. See Smart Meter Deployments Continue to Rise, EIA (Nov. 1, 2012), 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=8590. 
 5. See NIST, supra note 2, at 27; Robertson, supra note 2. 
 6. BRANDON J. MURRILL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42338, SMART METER 
DATA: PRIVACY AND CYBERSECURITY 5 (2012), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
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detailed information contained in smart meter data can provide police 
with infinitely more insight into people’s homes.7 
Traditionally, law enforcement would need a warrant to gain 
access to one’s home.8 However, smart meters take information about 
the activities that occur inside the home and put it in the hands of a 
third party—the utility company.9 Under the Third-Party Doctrine, 
that information loses Fourth Amendment protection and becomes 
subject to warrantless collection.10 This counter-intuitive result is 
produced by a line of Fourth Amendment cases that have 
conceptualized privacy as binary: personal information is either 
private or has been shared with a third party for any reason, making it 
public.11 
 
misc/R42338.pdf (“In the past, law enforcement agents have examined monthly electricity 
usage data from traditional meters in investigations of people they suspected of illegally 
growing marijuana.”). For legal background on law enforcement’s use of utility records, 
see generally United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 689 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2012); 
United States v. McIntyre, 646 F.3d 1107 (8th Cir. 2011); Idaho v. Kluss, 867 P.2d 247 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1993); New Jersey v. Domicz, 871 A.2d 744 (N.J. Super. 2005). 
 7. MURRILL ET AL., supra note 6, at 1 (“As we progress into the 21st century, access 
to personal data, including information generated from smart meters, is a new frontier for 
police investigations.”); Joint Comments of the Center for Democracy & Technology and 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation on Proposed Policies and Findings Pertaining to the 
Smart Grid 4, Order Instituting Rulemaking to Consider Smart Grid Tech., RM 08-12-009 
(Pub. Util. Comm’n of the State of Cal. Dec. 18, 2008), available at https://www.eff.org/ 
files/cdteffjointcomment030910.pdf [hereinafter CDT & EFF Joint Comments]. 
 8. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“The Fourth Amendment provides 
that ‘the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.’ . . . With few exceptions, 
the question [of] whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence 
constitutional must be answered no.” (alteration in original)). 
 9. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 10. See McIntyre, 646 F.3d at 1111–12 (applying Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 
(1979), in which the Court found no expectation of privacy in phone records “voluntarily 
conveyed” to a telephone company, and holding that the same was true of utility records 
“voluntarily conveyed” to a utility company). For an explanation of the Third-Party 
Doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 53–64. 
 11. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979). (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the Court for treating privacy as a “discrete commodity, possessed absolutely 
or not at all”); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth 
Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002) 
(arguing that courts, in “treating exposure to a limited audience as identical to exposure to 
the world,” have failed “to recognize degrees of privacy in the Fourth Amendment 
context”); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy As Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 
136–37 (2004) (arguing that current legal approaches express “a right to privacy in terms 
of dichotomies—sensitive and non-sensitive, private and public, government and 
private . . . . That which falls within any one of the appropriate halves warrants privacy 
consideration; for the rest, anything goes”). Daniel Solove has referred to this concept as 
“privacy as secrecy”—if information is no longer totally secret, it is public. Daniel Solove, 
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1107 (2002) (“In a variety of legal 
contexts, the view of privacy as secrecy often leads to the conclusion that once a fact is 
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Since the adoption of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
test in Katz v. United States,12 courts have relied on public/private 
dichotomies as substitutes for genuine inquiries into society’s 
expectations of privacy.13 The Third-Party Doctrine epitomizes this 
binary approach, holding that information disclosed to a third party 
under any circumstances is public.14 The doctrine has been invoked to 
remove Fourth Amendment protection from financial records,15 
phone records,16 cell site location data,17 email records,18 and Internet 
browsing data.19 Much of our personal information—whom we call or 
email, what we buy, what we read, where we travel—is contained in 
electronic records, and many of these records are stored on third-
party servers.20 By removing constitutional privacy protections from 
 
divulged in public, no matter how limited or narrow the disclosure, it can no longer remain 
private.”). 
 12. 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 13. See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND 
THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 113–14 (2010); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF 
REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 7 (2007); Danielle 
Keats Citron, Fulfilling Government 2.0’s Promise with Robust Privacy Protections, 78 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 822, 826–27 (2010) (citing Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The 
Public-Private Distinction in American Law and Life, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 237, 247–50 
(1987)); Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 643, 
657–59 (2013); Shaun B. Spencer, The Surveillance Society and the Third-Party Privacy 
Problem, 65 S.C. L. REV. 373, 377–80 (2013). 
 14. See Colb, supra note 11, at 122. 
 15. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976). 
 16. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46. 
 17. See generally United States. v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding 
government’s violation of the Stored Communications Act did not require suppression of 
defendant’s historical cell cite location data); In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 
F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard is 
not applicable to historical cell site information); In re Application of U.S.A. for an Order 
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c) and 2703(d) Directing AT&T, Sprint/Nextel, T-Mobile, 
Metro PCS and Verizon Wireless to Disclose Cell Tower Log Information, No. M-30, 2014 
WL 4388397 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2014) (holding the Fourth Amendment did not preclude 
the government from requiring providers to disclose historical cell site data); United 
States v. Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341 (D. Vt. 2013) (holding that defendant had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his real time cell phone location information); United 
States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012) (finding that defendants did not have 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in historical cell site location records); United States v. 
Gordon, No. 09-153-02 (RMV), 2012 WL 8499876 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2012) (finding that no 
reasonable expectation of privacy exists for cell site location data shared with third 
parties). 
 18. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509–10 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Spencer, supra note 13, at 390–91 (“[T]he Internet service providers on whom 
we rely for essential connectivity record the websites we visit, the files we download, and 
the people whom we email or message. Everyday transactions, both online and in real 
space, convey a plethora of data to third parties.”). 
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this vast swath of data, the Third-Party Doctrine has swallowed the 
Fourth Amendment. Scholars have argued that the Third-Party 
Doctrine’s blunt approach does not fit the reality of digital data.21 
Some scholars have advanced a “contextual approach” to Fourth 
Amendment privacy—one that looks to social norms to determine 
whether a particular disclosure is “expected” under the 
circumstances.22 
With its recent decision in Riley v. California,23 the Supreme 
Court has taken an encouraging step toward a more contextual 
approach to digital privacy.24 In Riley, a unanimous Court refused to 
extend the search-incident-to-arrest warrant exception to the contents 
of an arrestee’s cell phone.25 Although Riley did not deal directly with 
the Third-Party Doctrine,26 it weakened the doctrine’s assumptions in 
at least two ways. First, the Riley Court acknowledged that digital 
data, stored and aggregated in large quantities, can reveal a detailed 
picture of an individual’s private life, imbuing each individual piece of 
data with an informational value that it might not have had standing 
alone.27 In fact, the Court compared the contents of a cell phone to 
the contents of one’s home.28 Second, and more importantly, the 
Court rejected the assumption that expectations of privacy are binary 
when it held that an arrestee could forfeit Fourth Amendment 
protection in a cigarette pack but not a cell phone, even if both were 
stored in his pocket.29 
 
 21. See, e.g., id. at 376 (describing the ways in which “the binary conception of privacy 
cannot address the third-party privacy problem in the emerging surveillance society”); 
Solove, supra note 11, at 1151–52 (“The Court’s jurisprudence in these [Third-Party 
Doctrine] cases conceptualizes privacy as a form of total secrecy; however, this conception 
is ill-suited for the circumstances involved in these cases. . . . Life in the modern 
Information Age often involves exchanging information with third parties . . . . Thus, 
clinging to the notion of privacy as total secrecy would mean the practical extinction of 
privacy in today’s world.”). 
 22. Nissenbaum, supra note 11, at 120; Selbst, supra note 13, at 643–44; Solove, supra 
note 11, at 1091–92; Spencer, supra note 13, at 373. 
 23. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 24. See id. at 2478. 
 25. Id. at 2485. 
 26. Id. at 2489 n.1 (“[T]hese cases do not implicate the question whether the 
collection or inspection of aggregated digital information amounts to a search under other 
circumstances.”). 
 27. See id. at 2489. 
 28. Id. at 2491. (“Indeed, a cell phone search would typically expose to the 
government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house . . . .”). 
 29. See id. at 2488 (“The fact that an arrestee has diminished privacy interests does 
not mean that the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture entirely . . . . The United 
States asserts that a search of all data stored on a cell phone is ‘materially 
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In the Court’s view, the mere fact that we can now carry vast 
amounts of personal information in our pockets does not mean we do 
not expect some privacy in that data.30 Third-Party Doctrine critics 
argue that the same is true of information held by third parties—it 
subverts society’s expectations to hold that information stored on a 
hard drive is private while information stored in the cloud is public.31 
This Recent Development argues that when this more contextual 
approach is applied to the warrantless collection of smart meter 
data—information about activities that occur inside the home but 
collected by a third-party provider—the Third-Party Doctrine 
becomes irreconcilable with the Fourth Amendment principles 
articulated in Riley. 
This Recent Development proceeds in three parts. Part I 
discusses the development of the Fourth Amendment expectation of 
privacy doctrine, focusing on how the doctrine has evolved in the face 
of technology. Part II discusses two categories of Fourth Amendment 
interpretation: one that treats information privacy as a binary 
public/private concept and another that treats expectations of privacy 
as contextual. Part II argues that Riley’s approach to digital privacy 
falls toward the latter category by subverting expectations and 
attempts to put privacy back in context by grappling with the realities 
of how we interact with technology and the expectations we have for 
those interactions. Part II also notes that lower courts discussing Riley 
have suggested that the Supreme Court might overturn the Third-
Party Doctrine if confronted with a set of facts that was Riley-esque 
but where police obtained the data from a third party instead of 
directly from an individual. Part III argues that those facts can be 
found in the case of smart meters. By putting highly personal 
information—one’s activities inside the home—in the hands of a third 
party, the smart grid models the perverse effects of the Third-Party 
Doctrine in the digital age. 
 
indistinguishable’ from searches of [physical items such as cigarette packs]. . . . That is like 
saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon.”). 
 30. See infra text accompanying notes 78–92. 
 31. See, e.g., Colb, supra note 11, at 155 (“The Court, however, makes the mistake of 
treating situations in which only a limited exposure has occurred as though there had been 
this kind of total, irreparable exposure. . . . The idea is flawed because it ignores norms 
about keeping confidences. . . . We do not expect, nor should we expect, that the strangers 
with whom we deal will broadcast our secrets generally.”). 
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I.  THE PRE-RILEY FOURTH AMENDMENT 
A. The Court’s Binary Approaches to Privacy 
The binary approaches to the Fourth Amendment are 
dichotomies that courts draw, essentially creating shortcuts to 
determine whether a constitutionally protected privacy interest exists. 
The first such dichotomy was whether the government had invaded a 
“constitutionally protected area.”32 Before the Court introduced the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test in Katz v. United States,33 the 
Fourth Amendment only applied to the “protected areas” 
enumerated in the Fourth Amendment: “Persons [e.g., bodies], 
houses, papers, and effects [e.g., cars].”34 Searches typically required 
police to physically enter a person’s home.35 In Olmstead v. United 
States36 and Goldman v. United States,37 the Court found that tapping 
or otherwise eavesdropping on a person’s phone call was not a Fourth 
Amendment search because it did not require penetration of the four 
walls of the home or office.38 These early cases reflected the narrow 
view that the ability to obtain information without entering into a 
“protected area” excluded that information from Fourth Amendment 
protection. For Fourth Amendment purposes, information was either 
obtainable only in a protected area and therefore private, or the 
information was public. 
In 1967, the Supreme Court redefined the contours of the Fourth 
Amendment when it decided Katz.39 The Court held that FBI agents 
had conducted an unconstitutional warrantless search when they 
attached an electronic recording device to the exterior of a public 
phone booth and recorded Katz’s conversations.40 Rejecting the 
appeals court’s reasoning that there was no search because the device 
 
 32. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57, 59 (1967) (“It is true that this Court has 
occasionally described its conclusions in terms of ‘constitutionally protected areas’ . . . but 
we have never suggested that this concept can serve as a talismanic solution to every 
Fourth Amendment problem.”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 n.9 (1967) (citing 
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 
427, 438 (1963). 
 33. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 34. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 35. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352–53 (“It is true that the absence of such [physical] penetration 
was at one time thought to foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry . . . for that 
Amendment was thought to limit only searches and seizures of tangible property.” (citing 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464, 466 (1928))). 
 36. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 37. 316 U.S. 129 (1942). 
 38. 316 U.S. at 135–36; 277 U.S. at 466. 
 39. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–53. 
 40. Id. 
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did not penetrate the wall of the phone booth, Justice Potter Stewart 
declared that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places. . . . [W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”41 
The Katz Court still seemed to demand some level of secrecy,42 but it 
rejected the idea that “constitutionally protected areas” could provide 
a “talismanic solution” to Fourth Amendment questions.43 
When the Supreme Court introduced the “expectation of 
privacy” doctrine in Katz, it indicated that, to some extent, privacy 
would turn on social norms.44 A phone booth might be more exposed 
than one’s home, and a phone booth user may even know that his call 
could be intercepted, but the Court acknowledged a societal 
expectation that the content of one’s conversation would not flow 
beyond the parties to the conversation.45 However, even as it 
introduced this new doctrine, Katz maintained a binary 
conceptualization of privacy that relied on the secrecy of 
information.46 This secrecy model has become increasingly 
problematic in the digital age.47 As new technology has made it easier 
for law enforcement to collect formerly obscured information, courts 
 
 41. Id. at 351–52. 
 42. Id. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home 
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”); Solove, supra note 11, at 
1107 (“[T]he Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence adheres to the notion that matters 
that are no longer completely secret can no longer be private.” (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 
351)). 
 43. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 n.9. 
 44. Courts adopted Justice Harlan’s interpretation of Katz, that the threshold 
question of whether a search occurred is whether a person “exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy” and whether that expectation was “one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ” Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Colb, supra 
note 11, at 123 (“[A]n honest inquiry into whether police have acted in a manner that 
exposes what would have remained hidden absent the transgression of a legal or social 
norm . . . would adhere to the doctrinal foundations of privacy as articulated in Katz.”); see 
also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (“[W]here an individual’s subjective 
expectation [of privacy] had been ‘conditioned’ by influences alien to well-recognized 
Fourth Amendment freedoms . . . [i]n determining whether a ‘legitimate expectation of 
privacy’ existed in such cases, a normative inquiry would be proper.”).  
 45. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (“But what [Katz] sought to exclude when he entered the 
booth . . . was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his right to do so simply because he made 
his calls from a place where he might be seen. . . . [A] person in a telephone booth may rely 
upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door 
behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume 
that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read 
the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has 
come to play in private communication.”). 
 46. See Solove, supra note 11, at 1107 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).  
 47. See id.  
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have envisioned privacy as a “discrete commodity” that is wholly lost 
once information is exposed.48 In United States v. Knotts,49 the Court 
held that it was not a “search” to place a beeper in a suspect’s car and 
monitor his location using the signal, finding that “[a] person traveling 
in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”50 
Instead of evaluating whether society would expect a person’s every 
move to be followed, the Court focused on the fact that the 
movements occurred in public and were therefore vulnerable to 
collection.51 By limiting Fourth Amendment protection to secret 
information, the Court has traded one binary for another.52 
The Third-Party Doctrine is an extreme expression of this binary 
approach. The doctrine usually arises when law enforcement obtains 
information without a warrant and uses it as evidence in a criminal 
prosecution or to obtain a warrant.53 Under the doctrine, if 
information is exposed to any third party for any reason, it is no 
longer private and can be obtained without a warrant.54 The doctrine 
first arose in United States v. Miller,55 but its widespread adoption 
resulted from lower-court interpretations of Smith v Maryland.56 In 
that case, the Court held that no search occurred when law 
enforcement used a pen register device to obtain from the telephone 
company a record of the numbers dialed by an individual.57 Justice 
Blackburn, writing for the Court, found that Smith had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, since 
 
 48. Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see California v. Greenwood, 486 
U.S. 35, 39–41 (1988); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212–14 (1986); United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983). 
 49. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 50. Id. at 281. 
 51. Almost thirty years later, the Court considered similar facts in United States v. 
Jones but relied on the traditional trespass theory of the Fourth Amendment to find that 
an expectation of privacy was violated when police physically installed a GPS device on a 
suspect’s vehicle. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012). 
 52. Solove, supra note 11, at 1107 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 
(1967)). 
 53. See generally Smith, 442 U.S. 735 (reviewing a case where the telephone company 
installed a pen register without a warrant to record the numbers dialed from a phone); 
United States. v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2014) (involving historical cell site 
location data that was obtained without a warrant); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 
500 (9th Cir. 2007) (considering a case where the government used computer surveillance 
techniques without a warrant). 
 54. See Forrester, 512 F.3d at 509–10. 
 55. 425 U.S. 435, 440–42 (1976) (holding that there was no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in financial documents “voluntarily conveyed” to a bank). 
 56. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 57. Id. at 745–46. 
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telephone users “typically know that they must convey numerical 
information to the company” for “legitimate business purposes.”58 
The Court in 1979 could not have foreseen its impact on privacy in 
the digital age, but the doctrine endures nonetheless.59 
Now that most of our data is stored on third-party servers, the 
Third-Party Doctrine has effectively removed vast amounts of digital 
data—much of which includes personal information—from Fourth 
Amendment protection. Information deemed open to warrantless 
collection includes location data transmitted through cell phone 
signals,60 IP addresses and other information provided to an Internet 
Service Provider,61 and even files downloaded using peer-to-peer file 
sharing software.62 As Part III will discuss, multiple federal courts 
have found energy usage data to be subject to warrantless collection 
from utility companies.63 In many ways, the Third-Party Doctrine 
represents a return to outmoded ideas that the Fourth Amendment 
only protects certain inherently private spaces. If the doctrine were 
taken to its logical extreme, data stored on one’s phone would be 
protected while the same data stored on a cloud server would be 
unprotected.64 The doctrine betrays Katz by making this first-
 
 58. Id. at 743. 
 59. Smith v. Obama, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1009 (D. Idaho 2014) (“Smith [v. Maryland] 
could never have anticipated the ubiquity of cell-phones and the fact that ‘people in 2013 
have an entirely different relationship with phones than they did thirty-four years ago.’ ” 
(quoting Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 36 (D.D.C. 2013))). 
 60. See United States. v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 359 (5th Cir. 2014); In re Application 
of United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2013); In re 
Application of United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(C) and 2703(D) 
Directing AT&T, Sprint/Nextel, T-Mobile, Metro PCS and Verizon Wireless to Disclose 
Cell Tower Log Information, No. M-50, 2014 WL 4388397, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2014); 
United States v. Caraballo, 963 F. Supp.2d 341, 363 (D. Vt. 2013); United States v. 
Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 390 (D. Md. 2012); United States v. Gordon, No. 09-153-
02(RMU), 2012 WL 8499876, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2012). 
 61. See United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Rigmaiden, No. CR 08-814-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1932800, at *1 (D. Ariz. 2013); In re 
Application of United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 830 F. Supp. 
2d 114, 114 (E.D. Va. 2011). 
 62. See United States v. Dennis, 3:13-cr-10-TCB, 2014 WL 1908734, at *1 (N.D. Ga. 
May 12, 2014); United States v. Thomas, 5:12-cr-37, 2013 WL 6000484, at *19–20 (D. Vt. 
Nov. 8, 2013). 
 63. See United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 689 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 
2012); United States v. McIntyre, 646 F.3d 1107, 1111 (8th Cir. 2011); Naperville Smart 
Meter Awareness v. Naperville, No. 11 C 9299, 2013 WL 1196580, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
22, 2013); State v. Kluss, 867 P.2d 247, 247 (Idaho App. 1993); see also infra Part III 
(providing a more in depth discussion of the warrantless collection of energy usage data by 
utilities). 
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party/third-party dichotomy a “talismanic solution” to Fourth 
Amendment questions. 
B. Contextual Approaches to Privacy 
Despite this persistent trend, the Court has occasionally 
recognized the contextual nature of privacy, acknowledging that 
information can be vulnerable to collection without losing its 
protection wholesale.65 The contextual approach to privacy was first 
introduced by Helen Nissenbaum as the “contextual integrity” theory 
of privacy,66 which has since been adapted as a Fourth Amendment 
model by other scholars.67 According to Nissenbaum, privacy requires 
“respect for the appropriate flow of information about identifiable 
persons within particular social contexts.”68 Different contexts, such 
as healthcare, home life, and finance, are governed by different 
information norms. These norms are determined based on the 
particular “actors” (the subjects, receivers, and senders of 
information), informational “attributes” (the type of record, e.g., a 
medical record), and “transmission principles” at play (e.g., whether 
the record was disclosed for a specific reason or use or whether there 
was a confidential relationship between the parties).69 Privacy is 
violated when these norms are broken.70 
In United States v. Jones,71 the Court acknowledged that 
information once viewed as “public”—individuals’ movements from 
place to place on public thoroughfares—might implicate privacy 
interests when collected over a long period of time.72 However, the 
Jones majority resorted to the binary “trespass” theory of the Fourth 
Amendment to ultimately decide the case.73 In Kyllo v. United 
States,74 the Court refused to apply such a “mechanical interpretation 
of the Fourth Amendment” as to find that the use of thermal imaging 
was not a search because it only detected heat radiating from a 
home’s external surface.75 Instead, the Court found the use of 
 
information found on a cell phone is stored on the phone itself or in the cloud. Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014). 
 65. See infra text accompanying notes 67–72. 
 66. Nissenbaum, supra note 11, at 136–37. 
 67. See Selbst, supra note 13, at 643–44. 
 68. Id. at 650 (citing NISSENBAUM, supra note 13, at 127). 
 69. Id. at 651. 
 70. Nissenbaum, supra note 11, at 138. 
 71. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 72. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 73. Id. at 950 (majority opinion). 
 74. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 75. Id. at 28. 
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technology to obtain information about the interior of the home 
analogous to physically intruding into the home.76 Unfortunately, 
Kyllo also stopped short of a truly contextual approach to privacy. 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion emphasized the use of technology 
“not in general public use” to obtain information “regarding the 
interior of the home” not otherwise obtainable without physical 
intrusion.77 Kyllo thus left unanswered the question of whether a 
technology in general use, such as a smart meter, could reveal 
personal information in a context that is contrary to society’s 
expectations. As Part II will discuss, Riley went a step further toward 
contextualizing privacy. 
II.  THE RILEY COURT’S APPROACH TO DIGITAL DATA 
In Riley, the Supreme Court considered whether cell phone data 
fell under the search-incident-to-lawful-arrest warrant exception, 
which allows officers to search an arrestee’s person, including items 
found in his pockets, such as a cigarette pack.78 A unanimous Court 
found that a warrant was required to search a cell phone because 
“digital information on a cell phone . . . implicates substantially 
greater individual privacy interests than a brief physical search.”79 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, compared a cell phone to 
a person’s house80 in its capacity to hold different types of data in 
large quantities and reveal “[t]he sum of an individual’s private life.”81 
Moreover, the Court did not find that the search was justified based 
on the “arrestee’s reduced privacy interests upon being taken into 
police custody.”82 The Court found the search to be more than a 
“minor additional intrusion[]” into the arrestee’s privacy.83 Roberts 
wrote that “[t]he fact that an arrestee has diminished privacy interests 
does not mean that the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture 
entirely.”84 The Court declined to categorically subject to 
unwarranted search all of an arrestee’s information simply because he 
could carry it in a device in his pocket.85 Thus, the Riley Court 
rejected a binary application of the Fourth Amendment and 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 34. 
 78. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014). 
 79. Id. at 2478. 
 80. Id. at 2491. 
 81. Id. at 2489. 
 82. Id. at 2488. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 2488–89. 
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acknowledged that the nature of digital data and the context of 
disclosure bear on society’s expectations of privacy. 
The privacy interests in Riley turned on the ability of digital data, 
when stored in large quantities, to reconstruct a person’s life.86 Chief 
Justice Roberts’s opinion focused on the “quantitative” and 
“qualitative” differences between digital data stored on a cell phone 
and physical objects such as a cigarette pack.87 Roberts wrote that cell 
phones combine “immense storage capacity” with “the ability to store 
many different types of information,” resulting in data “that reveal 
much more in combination than any isolated record,” and allowing 
“even just one type of information to convey far more than previously 
possible.”88 Citing Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in United States v. 
Jones,89 the Chief Justice concluded that “[t]he sum of an individual’s 
private life,” including his “specific movements down to the minute, 
not only around town but also within a particular building,” could be 
reconstructed through the data found on a smart phone.90 When large 
quantities of data are stored in one place, each individual piece of 
data—perhaps meaningless on its own—becomes more informative 
by relation to the other data.91 Riley is the first majority Supreme 
Court opinion to recognize this mosaic-like effect of cell phone data 
and its privacy implications.92 
The Riley Court’s approach to expectations of privacy was more 
contextual than binary. The Court refused to view all information 
found on an arrestee’s person as subject to disclosure because of its 
proximity to the arrestee and because of the arrest itself.93 Instead, 
the Court looked at the context of the disclosure and the nature of the 
information to determine that an arrestee maintained a privacy 
 
 86. Id. at 2484. 
 87. Id. at 2489. In response to the government’s argument that a search of all data 
stored on a cell phone was materially indistinguishable from searches of physical items, 
Chief Justice Roberts famously wrote, “That is like saying a ride on horseback is 
materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon.” Id. at 2488. 
 88. Id. at 2478–89. 
 89. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 90. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489–90 (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J. 
concurring)). 
 91. Id; see Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955. 
 92. For a definition of “mosaic theory,” see Tracey v. State, 152 So.3d 504, 520 (Fla. 
2014) (“The theory that discrete acts of surveillance by law enforcement may be lawful in 
isolation, but may otherwise infringe on reasonable expectations of privacy in the 
aggregate because they ‘paint an “intimate picture” of a defendant’s life,’ has been 
referred to as the ‘mosaic’ theory.” (quoting United States v. Wilford, 961 F. Supp. 2d 740, 
771 (D. Md. 2013))).  
 93. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488–89. 
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interest in this immense trove of personal information.94 Viewed 
through the lens of Nissenbaum’s theory, the inquiry in Riley was 
sensitive to the change in informational attributes between a cigarette 
pack, which is limited in its ability to contain information, and a cell 
phone, which has limitless informational value. The Court understood 
that this difference affected the social norms governing the disclosure 
of information in each case.95 While we might expect the physically 
tangible items we carry in our pockets to be searched and even seized 
if we are taken into police custody, we do not expect all of the 
contents of our cell phones—contacts, text messages, emails, 
documents, pictures—to be disclosed just because we can also carry 
that data around in our pockets. 
Despite the fact that Riley explicitly did not overturn the Third-
Party Doctrine,96 at least one lower court has noted its potential 
impact on future digital privacy cases that do implicate third parties.97 
In United States v. Guerrero,98 the Fifth Circuit upheld the warrantless 
collection of historical cell site location information (“CSLI”) based 
on the fact that the government obtained the information from a third 
party.99 While nothing in Riley would allow the Fifth Circuit to ignore 
the Third-Party Doctrine precedent, the court suggested that perhaps 
the ‘technology is different’ rationale that led the Riley Court to 
treat an arrestee’s cell phone differently from his wallet will one 
day lead the Court to treat historical cell site data in the 
possession of a cellphone provider differently from a pen 
register in the possession of a pay phone operator.100  
The court added that “commentators have debated the effect Riley 
may have if a ‘third party’ case involving modern technology were to 
end up at the Court.”101 The next part of this Recent Development 
argues that a challenge to law enforcement collection of smart meter 
data could be just such a case. 
 
 94. Id. at 2490–91. 
 95. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
 96. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 n.1. Riley only concerned the collection of data directly 
from a person’s device and not from a third party, and the fact that the data collection was 
a search was not at issue. See id. at 2484. 
 97. United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 359 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 98. 768 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 99. Id. at 358. 
 100. Id. at 360. 
 101. Id. 
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III.  SMART METERS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The current application of the Fourth Amendment to utility data 
ignores the possibility that society might expect the data to be 
disclosed in certain contexts and not in others. Since utility data is 
created specifically to be collected by a utility company and can only 
be collected from a third party, all data generated about a 
household’s use of electricity, regardless of its ability to reveal 
personal information, falls outside of the Fourth Amendment.102 
Utility data concerns information from inside one’s home, the core of 
Fourth Amendment protection.103 Smart meter data ups the ante by 
providing infinitely more information about the lifestyles and 
behaviors of a household’s inhabitants.104 This is a paradigmatic 
example of how the Third-Party Doctrine subverts society’s 
expectations of privacy by classifying information as either wholly 
private (if secret) or wholly public (if disclosed). 
This Part provides background information on smart meters and 
the smart grid and discusses the privacy problems associated with 
smart meters. It then discusses the case law, which reveals that the 
Third-Party Doctrine has removed Fourth Amendment protection 
from utility data, including smart meter data. This Part concludes with 
an argument that a contextual approach to Fourth Amendment 
expectations of privacy would protect smart meter data from flowing 
beyond utility companies but for the inharmonious Third-Party 
Doctrine. Thus, the Supreme Court should follow the trajectory it 
started with Riley and overturn the Third-Party Doctrine. 
A. Smart Meters and Privacy 
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Title XIII, 
established a national policy to modernize electricity transmission and 
distribution.105 Part of the policy involves implementing new 
technologies to increase the amount and flow of information about 
energy use between consumers and utilities.106 Taken together, these 
technologies make up the “smart grid.”107 As part of this effort to 
 
 102. See supra text accompanying notes 1–11; infra text accompanying notes 105–10. 
 103. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 42 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)). 
 104. See NIST, supra note 2, at 26. 
 105. See generally Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-140, 121 
Stat. 1492 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17381 (2012)) (including energy independence and 
security as one of several clean energy goals). 
 106. 42 U.S.C. § 17381 (2012). 
 107. Id. 
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modernize the grid, utility companies increasingly are installing smart 
meters on consumers’ homes.108 In 2011, the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration reported that more than thirty-three million U.S. 
utility customers had smart meters.109 Three million additional smart 
meters were installed between January and August 2012, and the 
agency estimated that the number of customers with smart meters 
would exceed eighty million by 2015.110 
In many places, smart meter adoption is all but compulsory. 
Utility companies typically inform the consumer that a smart meter 
will be installed and then send an employee to install the meter.111 In 
2012, responding to consumer complaints, the California Public 
Utilities Commission required Pacific Gas and Electric Company to 
provide consumers in California the option to opt out of smart meter 
installation.112 Some other states have opt-out processes, some of 
which involve charging an opt-out fee.113 Other states do not provide 
information or instructions to consumers for opting out.114 
Smart meters constantly collect fine-grained data on a 
household’s electricity use and transmit the data to the utility 
companies as frequently as every fifteen minutes.115 They generate up 
to 3,000 data points per month per household.116 The meters are 
touted as a tool to help consumers save energy and money by keeping 
track of their energy use patterns over time.117 
These detailed records of electricity usage can reveal when a 
person goes to bed every night and wakes up every morning, how 
 
 108. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 3, at 1. 
 109. See id. 
 110. Id. attachment B, 1. 
 111. Federico Guerrini, Smart Meters: Between Economic Benefits and Privacy 
Concerns, FORBES (June 1, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/federicoguerrini/ 
2014/06/01/smart-meters-friends-or-foes-between-economic-benefits-and-privacy-
concerns/. 
 112. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., Agenda ID No. 10870, at 40 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Nov. 
22, 2011), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/efile/PD/153864.pdf. 
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NPR (Oct. 30, 2013), http://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2013/10/30/opt-out-of-a-smart-meter-
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 114. Duke Energy’s smart grid information web pages, for example, do not include 
information about opting out. See Grid Modernization FAQs, DUKE ENERGY, 
http://www.duke-energy.com/about-us/smart-grid-faq.asp (last visited Jan. 5, 2015). 
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EXPRESS-NEWS (Aug. 20, 2011), http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/energy/article/Smart-
meter-energy-data-now-online-2133522.php. 
 116. Lee Tien, New “Smart Meters” for Energy Use Put Privacy at Risk, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 10, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/03/new-smart-
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many people live in a household, when people are at home and out of 
town, and even what specific appliance is being used at a given 
time.118 Over time, these data can reconstruct a detailed picture of 
people’s behavior and private lives.119 A Privacy Impact Assessment 
conducted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(“NIST”) concluded that the data collected by smart meters raise 
privacy concerns because they can reveal consumers’ lifestyle 
information and information about the use of specific appliances.120 
New smart appliances come with unique “load signatures,” which can 
be identified through the analysis of smart meter data.121 By recording 
these load signatures, smart meters can reveal when and for how long 
a particular appliance was used.122 This information can provide 
insight into personal health information such as eating and exercise 
habits.123 In a 2012 study in Germany, researchers were able to 
analyze smart meter data to determine what television programs a 
household was watching.124 Thus, smart meter data implicates not 
only energy usage but also behavioral information and potentially 
even media consumption and communication records. 
As new localities continue to introduce smart meters, the data 
they collect remains largely unprotected. In its Privacy Impact 
Assessment, the NIST found a “lack of privacy laws or policies 
directly applicable to the smart grid.”125 Only a few states have passed 
laws limiting disclosure of utility data, and no federal law directly 
addresses this type of information.126 This treasure trove of 
information about people’s behavior will attract public and private 
entities alike that want to mine the data for commercial or 
surveillance purposes.127 Insurance companies, for example, might 
want to monitor the activities of households that are covered by their 
policies.128 Companies that sell smart appliances may want to monitor 
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 121. CDT & EFF Joint Comments, supra note 7, at 6. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Robertson, supra note 2. 
 125. NIST, supra note 2, at 21.  
 126. Id.; PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF THE STATE OF CAL., RULEMAKING 08-12-009, 
ORDER INSTITUTING RULEMAKING TO CONSIDER SMART GRID TECHS. PURSUANT TO 
FED. LEG. & ON THE COMM’N’S OWN MOT. TO ACTIVELY GUIDE POLICY IN CAL.’S DEV. 
OF A SMART GRID SYS., 83–87 (July 28, 2011). 
 127. CDT & EFF Joint Comments, supra note 7, at 5. 
 128. Id. at 6. 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1140 (2015) 
1156 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
the use of those appliances for warranty purposes.129 Some advertisers 
have already expressed their intent to use this data.130 WPP, the 
world’s biggest advertising agency, announced that it was teaming up 
with a London-based software company to study ways to collect smart 
meter data, saying that it would “open the door of the home.”131 And 
law enforcement, the focus of this Recent Development, may be 
interested in collecting smart meter data as part of criminal 
investigations.132 Like the cell phone at issue in Riley, smart meters 
can store and transmit, in large quantities, different types of personal 
information.133 However, because of the infrastructural design of 
smart meter technology, law enforcement officers can and do collect 
this data not from individuals directly but from third-party service 
providers.134 
B. Law Enforcement Collection of Utility Data 
Law enforcement historically has used energy use records in 
criminal investigations, usually involving marijuana-growing 
operations.135 In the years since Smith v. Maryland was decided, 
courts have relied on the Third-Party Doctrine to hold that no 
warrant is needed for the collection of these records from utility 
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companies.136 Most of these cases have involved traditional utility 
records, which show aggregated measures of energy use.137 
In United States v. Golden Valley Electric Association,138 the 
Ninth Circuit held that consumers lacked a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in energy consumption records because they had “no 
possessory or ownership interest” in the records held by a utility 
company.139 In Golden Valley, the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(“DEA”) served an administrative subpoena on Golden Valley, an 
electricity cooperative, to provide energy consumption records 
pertaining to three customer addresses.140 Golden Valley, which had a 
company policy of protecting the confidentiality of members’ records, 
challenged the subpoena on Fourth Amendment grounds.141 
Although the administrative subpoena was subject to relaxed Fourth 
Amendment standards, the Ninth Circuit addressed the consumers’ 
privacy interest in utility records.142 Relying on United States v. 
Miller,143 which involved the collection of bank records, the Court 
held that “[a] customer ordinarily lacks ‘a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in an item,’ like a business record, ‘in which he has no 
possessory or ownership interest.’ ”144 The court further concluded 
that the energy usage records were not “inherently personal or 
private.”145 Thus, instead of inquiring into society’s expectations 
regarding the disclosures, the Ninth Circuit conceived of utility 
records as “inherently” not private, based on the fact that they were 
held by a third party and thus out of the consumers’ physical control. 
It ignored the confidential relationship between the utility company 
and its customers and the effect of that relationship on the social 
norms governing the flow of information. 
In Idaho v. Kluss,146 the Court of Appeals of Idaho adopted 
Smith v. Maryland’s binary “voluntary disclosure” approach to 
 
 136. See Golden Valley, 689 F.3d at 1111; McIntyre, 646 F.3d at 1113; Kluss, 867 P.2d at 
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privacy.147 In Kluss, an Idaho Bureau of Narcotics officer obtained 
defendant Kluss’s power consumption information without a warrant 
from a utility company in order to determine whether Kluss was using 
special marijuana “grow lights.”148 The officer was able to compare 
Kluss’s consumption to that of the previous residents to determine 
that Kluss’s consumption was high.149 The officer used this 
information to obtain a subpoena for the written utility records and a 
warrant to search Kluss’s home.150 Kluss was ultimately convicted of 
growing and possessing marijuana.151 The court held that, under Smith 
v. Maryland, “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties,” and thus the 
Fourth Amendment does not protect utility records.152 This 
“voluntary disclosure” approach ignores the context of disclosure and 
its effect on expectations of privacy. It treats any disclosure to any 
party for any reason as a voluntary ceding of all privacy protection. 
In United States v. McIntyre,153 the Eighth Circuit acknowledged 
that utility records can reveal normally protected information about 
the inside of a person’s house but still declined to protect that 
information when law enforcement collected it from a third party.154 
In McIntyre, Nebraska State Patrol investigator Jason Sears obtained 
defendant McIntyre’s electricity usage records using an administrative 
subpoena.155 Sears discovered a spike in McIntyre’s electricity usage 
for November 2008, which later turned out to be inaccurate, and cited 
that spike in an affidavit to obtain a warrant for thermal imaging to 
detect a marijuana growing operation.156 McIntyre argued that 
investigators should have obtained a warrant because his utility 
records “contained intimate details about the interior of his home.”157 
The Eighth Circuit reaffirmed that there was no expectation of 
privacy in information revealed to a third party, “even if the 
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for 
a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not 
be betrayed.”158 The language of McIntyre is telling. It reveals the 
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Third-Party Doctrine’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as 
completely divorced from social norms and expectations of 
confidentiality. 
McIntyre argued that “power records are different” because they 
reveal information about the interior of one’s home.159 He relied on 
Kyllo, arguing that the information obtained was indistinguishable 
from that in Kyllo.160 The court rejected McIntyre’s argument because 
“the manner in which the information was obtained in Kyllo” bore 
“no resemblance to obtaining power data from a third party.”161 Thus, 
while McIntyre and Kyllo both concerned information about the 
interior of the home, Kyllo did not apply because the officers in 
McIntyre could obtain the information from a third party without 
using “sense-enhancing technology.”162 This interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment resembles the outmoded “constitutionally 
protected areas” doctrine.163 The court used arbitrary digital 
boundaries to define expectations of privacy rather than conducting a 
normative inquiry into society’s expectations.164 
In 2013, the Northern District of Illinois applied the Third-Party 
Doctrine to smart meter data in Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. 
City of Naperville.165 Naperville Smart Meter Awareness (“NSMA”), 
a coalition of Naperville, Illinois residents who were required to have 
smart meters installed at their homes or businesses, sought to enjoin 
Naperville from installing the smart meters until reasonable privacy 
safeguards were in place and a satisfactory alternative option for all 
customers was available.166 The court extended Smith v. Maryland, 
finding that the residents consented to having their information 
monitored by transmitting it to the utility company.167 Naperville did 
not involve the collection of information from a third party—the 
objected-to collection was by the third party itself. By extending the 
Third-Party Doctrine in this case, the court equated plaintiffs’ 
knowledge of the data collection with consent, even though the 
plaintiffs were suing in objection to the collection itself. This rationale 
is an example of a “well-known logical trap” in which the knowledge 
of data collection is equated with the inability to expect privacy in the 
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data.168 The knowledge-as-consent rationale is particularly 
counterintuitive in the case of utility meters, which are necessary 
fixtures for most people who use electricity.169 
The cases applying the Third-Party Doctrine to utility data take a 
binary approach to information privacy. Even though customers 
disclose their data only to the utility company for the limited purpose 
of billing, this limited disclosure exempts the information from Fourth 
Amendment protection. Reasonable assumptions about 
confidentiality between the consumer and the utility company do not 
bear on the courts’ inquiry into whether a reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists. This approach is contrary to that in Riley, which 
recognized that the specific context of a disclosure—not the storage 
method or vulnerability of the data to collection—determines 
whether society expects privacy.170 
C. A Contextual Approach to Smart Meter Privacy 
This Recent Development has argued that Riley adopted a 
much-needed contextual approach to digital privacy by (a) 
acknowledging that digital data, stored and aggregated in large 
quantities, can reveal a detailed picture of an individual’s private life, 
imbuing each individual piece of data with an informational value 
that it might not have had standing alone, and (b) refusing to equate 
the vulnerability of information with a loss of privacy interests. 
Applying the same principles to smart meter data would support its 
protection under the Fourth Amendment. 
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The type of information that can be learned from collecting and 
analyzing smart meter data lies at the core of Fourth Amendment 
protection.171 Smart meters implicate privacy by aggregating hundreds 
of thousands of data points that together reconstruct the behavioral 
patterns of a household.172 Law enforcement already uses traditional 
utility data to learn information from inside the home, and smart 
meters would only increase the amount, types, quality, and accuracy 
of information available to law enforcement.173 Information inside the 
home is the paradigmatic example of the Fourth Amendment-
protected sphere.174 In Katz, the Court abandoned the 
“constitutionally protected areas” that limited warrant requirements 
to physical intrusions into the home.175 In Kyllo, it confirmed that the 
use of an electronic device to obtain such information was a Fourth 
Amendment search.176 In Riley, the Court found that the search of a 
cell phone, with its large capacity to store many different types of 
data, was similar to searching one’s home.177 Like a cell phone, smart 
meters are designed to collect vast amounts of digital data from inside 
the home—data that is even more revealing than that obtained by the 
heat sensors used in Kyllo. Smart meters combine the newer digital 
mosaic concerns raised in Riley with the time-tested privacy of the 
home as enshrined in the Fourth Amendment’s history. Through 
smart meters, information once protected by physical boundaries now 
flows electronically and is aggregated in a way that it could not have 
been before this technology existed. The question of smart meter 
privacy thus demonstrates the need for Fourth Amendment standards 
to adapt to protect traditional privacy concerns in the digital age. 
Under the Third-Party Doctrine, the type of information 
collected by smart meters would be protected if obtained without a 
warrant directly from a person’s home, but not from a third-party 
utility company. This binary public/private conception of the Fourth 
Amendment is a regression to the “constitutionally protected areas” 
doctrine abandoned in Katz—that is, the idea that information is 
private only if stored in a protected, “private” place.178 A contextual 
approach to privacy, like the one adopted in Riley, requires asking not 
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whether the information was obtained from a protected area or 
whether it was “inherently” private, but whether society would expect 
the information to have the potential to be exposed in a particular 
context. It requires asking whether, upon having a meter installed 
that automatically relays energy usage data to a utility company for 
billing purposes, a person expects that the data can be shared with law 
enforcement and other agencies without additional consent or a 
warrant. 
Under a contextual lens, the role of the home as a social 
institution is one of solitude and seclusion.179 Thus, warrantless 
collection of information from inside the home typically violates 
social norms. Other evidence provides additional insight into the 
social norms that govern the transmission of smart meter data. Smart 
meter data is transmitted to the utility company for billing purposes 
and to help both the utility and the household manage electricity 
use.180 Evidence from the case law surrounding smart meters suggests 
that customers may, at least implicitly, expect a utility company to 
maintain confidentiality in energy usage data.181 California’s reporting 
requirements and the response to recent reports of disclosures suggest 
that the disclosure of an individual’s smart meter data to a third party 
without express consent violates social norms.182 Thus, social norms in 
the context of smart meter data would prohibit the data from flowing 
beyond the utility company. 
 While the Third-Party Doctrine is couched in the language of 
“reasonable expectations,” it never actually examines them. Instead, 
it equates the “voluntary” disclosure of data to a third party for a 
specific business purpose with consent to disclose the same data to 
law enforcement.183 If the information flows to any third party for any 
reason, all privacy is forfeited. This approach resembles the 
outmoded “constitutionally protected areas” doctrine in its reliance 
on binary distinctions. However, even the “constitutionally protected 
areas” approach placed paramount importance on the privacy of the 
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home, a concept that has endured throughout the history of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.184 Privacy scholar Andrew Selbst argued 
that the privacy of the home is an area that “would generate a 
consensus between” traditional Fourth Amendment analysis and a 
contextual approach to privacy.185 Under current law, “courts have 
said that the ‘home’ is such a quintessentially private place that 
physical intrusion even by a ‘fraction of an inch’ is too much.”186 
Under Selbst’s contextual analysis, “the home is a specific social 
context . . . subject to the transmission principle of control by the 
resident.”187 Allowing unwarranted intrusion in this context “would 
destroy the home as a social institution, generally seen as the one 
place it is always safe to retreat.”188 Applying the Third-Party 
Doctrine to smart meter data, as Selbst warns, would erode the 
integrity of the home by exposing the activities and behavioral 
patterns of its residents.189 In the case of smart meters, the Third-
Party Doctrine is thus incongruous not only with a contextual 
approach to privacy but also with longstanding Fourth Amendment 
values. 
CONCLUSION 
This Recent Development has argued that Riley’s approach to 
digital data, although it did not address the Third-Party Doctrine, will 
inevitably lead to the doctrine’s undoing. In Riley, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that old ideas about expectations of privacy do not 
hold up when law enforcement collects digital data.190 Because an 
arrestee’s pocket, which was once fair game for container searches, 
can now hold information in digital form about every aspect of the 
arrestee’s life, the context of that pocket and the social norms 
surrounding it have changed. Because Third-Party Doctrine’s binary 
approach to digital privacy does not accommodate such changing 
circumstances and norms, it will produce results that are contrary to 
basic reason and Fourth Amendment values, such as protecting data 
that is saved to a hard drive but not protecting the same data saved to 
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a cloud storage account. This incongruity is perhaps most apparent in 
the context of smart meters, where, under the Third-Party Doctrine, 
the Fourth Amendment fails to protect the home—the original 
impetus for the right to privacy. 
NATASHA H. DUARTE** 
 
**The author would like to thank Cathy Packer, Brooks Fuller, Anne Klinefelter, 
Woodrow Hartzog, Astrid Duarte, Tony Duarte, Alison Templeton, and the North 
Carolina Law Review board and staff. 
